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Leaving Unequal Pay in the Past: Why Reliance on Prior Pay Must Be Restricted Under 
the Equal Pay Act 
 
 
Part I. Introduction  
 
In 2017, Emma Stone won an Oscar and became the highest paid actress in Hollywood 
when she earned $26 million that year.1 While Stone has reached the top of her field, her success 
is undermined by the fact that at least fourteen other male actors, including her former co-star 
Ryan Gosling, were paid significantly higher salaries.2  When asked about the pay disparity by a 
magazine, Stone explained: “if a male co-star, who has a higher quote than me but believes we 
are equal, takes a pay cut so that I can match him, that changes my quote in the future and 
changes my life.”3  Stone’s life and future earnings are affected by her prior pay.4 The fact that 
even the highest-paid actress could not attain equal pay to her male co-stars demonstrates how 
reliance on prior pay has extensively hindered wage equality. Given that historically women 
continue to receive lower salaries than men for reasons other than relevant skill and experience, 
the average woman’s salary history likely reflects this disparity and the implicit effects of gender 
bias.5  
In a Ninth Circuit case, Rizo v. Yovino, a female mathematics consultant learned at lunch 
with her new male colleague that his salary was significantly higher despite their similar 
resumes.6 Soon after, Rizo filed an Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)  claim against her employer.7 The 
employer asserted in its defense that the prior salary of both Rizo and her coworker determined 
                                                 
1 Rachel Lewis, Emma Stone is the Highest-Paid Actress, but Makes Less Than Top 14 Actors, FORTUNE (Aug. 23, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/23/emma-stone-highest-paid-actors/. 
2 Id.  
3 Lisa Respers France, Emma Stone Says Male Co-Stars Have Taken Pay Cuts for Her, CNN (July 8, 2017, 12:26 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/07/entertainment/emma-stone-equal-pay/index.html.   
4 See id.  
5 See SUZANA CROSS, THE EQUAL PAY ACT, FIFTY YEARS ON 4 (2015).  
6 Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017). 
7 Id.  
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their salaries, rather than any bias against women; it further claimed that reliance on prior 
compensation was a reasonable business practice.8 Although the Court of Appeals panel 
originally sided with decades old precedent in accepting this defense based on prior pay, 9 the 
Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated this decision and granted an en banc review of the issue.10  
The controversy surrounding the Rizo case reflects a persisting divergence among the 
circuit courts on how to construe an employer’s reliance on prior pay as an EPA affirmative 
defense.  An underlying tension between accommodating business hiring needs yet recognizing 
the suppressive effect prior pay has on women’s salaries continues to drive this conflict.11 
Several circuits have deferred to business hiring policies and allow employers to assert sole 
reliance on prior pay without requiring any justifications.12 In contrast, other circuits reject 
reliance on prior salary as a single factor by viewing it as undermining the purpose of the EPA in 
a more rigorous approach.13 Additionally, courts following the “business justification” standard, 
a third, middle-ground approach, accept reliance as long as there are reasonable business 
justifications supporting it.14  
This comment will explore the broad, antidiscriminatory purpose and structure of the 
EPA in Part II. Part III will discuss the three different approaches taken by circuit courts on 
whether prior pay should be construed as a “factor other than sex.”  In Part IV, this comment will 
argue that the circuit courts should not accept an employer’s sole reliance on prior salary as 
                                                 
8 Id. at 1165.  
9 Id. at 1166-67.  
10 Rizo v. Yovino, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (order vacating the prior decision and granting en banc rehearing).  
11 See Nicole Porter and Jessica Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 159, 169 (2011). 
12 See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003); Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 47 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 
2005).  
13 See Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995); Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. 70 Fed. Appx. 500 (10 Cir. 
2003). Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2005). 
14 See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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satisfying the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense. In order to resolve the circuit split and support 
the EPA’s purpose to mitigate this pervasive cycle of wage inequality, the Supreme Court should 
rule that an employer cannot assert reliance on prior pay alone as a “factor other than sex” 
defense. To support this argument, this comment will reason that an employer’s use of prior 
salary as a determinative factor in setting wages perpetuates the consistently lower salaries paid 
on average to female employees. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s business justification approach 
is flawed because, while it claims to accommodate both employees and employers, its adverse 
effect on pay equality is no different from the even broader approach of the Eighth and Seventh 
Circuits.  
This comment will also argue that, while employers have a valid interest in relying on 
prior pay to incentivize desirable candidates, this does not excuse the need to place restrictions 
on prior salary reliance in order to promote wage equality. As the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits 
have held, prior salary may be properly used to accommodate both employee and employer 
interests if considered along with other factors, such as experience. If circuits courts across the 
board refuse to accept an affirmative EPA defense relying solely on prior pay, employers will be 
forced to rely on more legitimate factors that facilitate progress in wage equality. 
 
Part II. The Purpose and Structure of the Equal Pay Act 
 
In 1963, women, many working at the same jobs as men, earned fifty-nine cents for every 
dollar paid to a man.15 In the same year, Congress enacted a sweeping remedy to level the 
egregious injustice in discriminatory pay through the Equal Pay Act.16 More recently, women 
outnumber men in attaining both bachelor’s and master’s degrees and represent an almost equal 
                                                 
15 CROSS, supra note 5.  
16 See id.  
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percentage of the work force.17 Yet, after great progress, a substantial pay gap still exists. As of 
2017, women were paid eighty cents for every dollar paid to a man.18 Considering the 
comparable experience and education both genders now achieve, this disparity in average pay 
remains an unsolved and pervasive problem that society attempts to repair pursuant to the EPA’s 
purpose.19  
 
A. The Foundation of the Equal Pay Act   
 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that 
prohibits an employer from paying an employee less than it pays an employee of the opposite sex 
to perform “equal work,” unless the employer can justify the disparity through one of four 
statutory defenses.20  The statute states:  
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to 
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings 
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other 
factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate 
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the 
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.21 
 
 The EPA’s language and legislative history demonstrate Congress’s “broadly remedial” 
purpose.22  Congress intended to create a statute which would eradicate the “serious and endemic 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 Jessica L. Semega & Kayla R. Fontenot, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2016, UNITED STATES CENSUS 
BUREAU, (September 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60-
259.pdf. 
19 See CROSS, supra note 5. 
20 29 U.S.C § 206(d).  
21 29 U.S.C § 206(d)(1).  
22 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (citing legislative history).  
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problem” of discriminatory pay practices based on gender.23 In one congressional hearing, a 
representative emphasized that enacting the statute was a  “matter of simple justice to pay a 
woman the same rate as a man when she is performing the same duties.”24 Furthermore, the 
congressional hearings show that the bill arose out of women’s integral role in the work force 
and the undeniable injustice in perpetuating pay disparity when women were paying the same 
taxes, shouldering the same financial responsibilities, and performing the same work as men.25 
 
B. The Structure of an EPA claim  
 
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the EPA, a plaintiff, who is 
usually female, must show: that her employer has paid higher wages to an employee of the 
opposite sex and that the employees perform “equal work on jobs the performance of which  
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions.”26 Under this standard, the EPA functions as a strict liability statute because the 
plaintiff is not required to show that it was her employer’s intent to create a wage disparity on the 
basis of sex.27 In determining if a plaintiff has satisfied a required showing of equal work, courts 
have interpreted the “equal pay” standard to be “substantially equal” and have looked to job 
tasks rather than classifications or titles to make that determination.28 However, as one scholar 
has criticized, the EPA has increasingly acted as a glass ceiling to women working in non-
                                                 
23 Id.  
24  109 CONG. REC. 9193 (1963) (statement of Rep. Bolton).  
25 See 109 CONG. REC. 9201 (1963) (statement of Rep. Kelly).   
26 29 U.S.C § 206(d)(1).  
27 See Porter, supra note 11.  
28 See id.; see, e.g., Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. 
Distr., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1984).  
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standardized or upper-level positions who have faced difficulty in passing the equal work 
threshold.29  
 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to 
prove one of four statutory affirmative defenses or exceptions.30 Those defenses require an 
employer to prove that any wage differential is explained by "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit 
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a 
differential based on any other factor other than sex."31  
 
C. The Ambiguous Affirmative Defense of “Factors Other than Sex” 
 
The fourth affirmative defense, a pay differential based on any “factor other than sex,” is 
susceptible to multiple interpretations. The Supreme Court’s reluctance to provide a clear 
definition of this catch-all phrase has led to a wide variety of interpretations in lower courts.32 
One danger of interpreting the defense broadly is that allowing employers to assert pretextual 
reasons for pay disparity and possible biased objectives would contradict the purpose of the 
statute.33  However, the bigger issue is that, regardless of intent, employers’ reliance on factors 
which continuously set women’s salaries lower than men puts a ceiling on women’s 
compensation, and therefore, perpetuates the existing wage gap.34  
                                                 
29 Deborah Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 46 (2010) (stating that 
women who achieve leadership positions in their companies are not adequately protected by the EPA because 
“courts are more likely to accept that upper-level jobs are not comparable based on employers' blanket claims that 
work in different departments simply cannot be compared.”).    
30 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196.  
31 Id.; see 29 U.S.C § 206(d)(1).  
32 See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 205; Peter Avery, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How 
Can It Be Fixed, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 854 (2016).   
33 Id.  
34 See CROSS, supra note 5, at 4-5.  
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Despite over five decades since the EPA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has squarely 
addressed an EPA claim only in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.35 The case arose when men, 
who worked as inspectors during a night shift, demanded to be paid more than the women who 
performed the same tasks while working as inspectors during the day shift.36 Women were 
prohibited from working at night by both New York and Pennsylvania law at the time.37 The 
women sued, asking for the same rate paid to the males.38  Since the work itself was equivalent, 
the only “equal work” issue was whether different shifts rendered the job unequal.39  The Court 
held that the female workers met the “equal work” standard required for the prima facie case.40  
At that point, the employer defended the wage disparity under the fourth affirmative defense.41 
However, the Court held that a wage differential arising “simply because men would not work at 
the low rates paid [to] women” did not qualify as a “factor other than sex” and was a violation of 
the EPA because the women were being paid less based on their sex.42  
The Court further discussed the “factors other than sex” defense only four years after 
Corning Glass Works in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart.43 This 
case concerned a Title VII challenge to a company’s practice of charging female employees 
higher pension premiums based on the reasoning that women tended to live longer than men and, 
therefore, could anticipate more months of retirement benefits.44 In response to the employer’s 
argument that Title VII excused any pay differential that satisfied the EPA’s  “factors other than 
                                                 
35 See 417 U.S. at 196.  
36 Id. at 191-92.  
37 Id. at 191.  
38 Id. at 194-95.  
39 Id. at 190.  
40 Id. at 203. 
41 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204-05.  
42 Id. at 205; 207-8.  
43 435 U.S 702 (1978).  
44 Id.  
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sex” defense, the Court explained that the “other than sex” factor could not be based on sex 
itself.45 The court also implied that not every business-related factor qualifies under this defense 
by stating that while “[s]ome amici suggest that the Department’s discrimination is justified by 
business necessity…. there has been no showing that sex distinctions are reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of the Department's retirement plan.” 46  Therefore, the Court rejected the 
employer’s argument under the reasoning that the differential could not be excused because it 
was based on sex in the context of longevity.47   
 
Part III.  The Circuit Split on Reliance of Prior Pay 
 
While the Supreme Court addressed elements of the EPA in Corning Glass Works,48 it 
has not yet addressed if use of prior pay to set compensation constitutes a “factor other than sex” 
within the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense.  As a result, the circuit courts remain sharply 
divided on the issue of whether an employer may rely on prior pay alone as a justification for 
wage disparity in an EPA claim. 
In a broad interpretation of the statute, the Eighth and Seventh Circuits have determined 
that prior pay alone can stand as a “factor other than sex” defense without requiring an 
evaluation of reasonableness or a business justification for the employer’s reliance on it.49  The 
business justification standard, a middle-ground approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit,  permits 
reliance on prior salary alone as a “factor other than sex,” but only if it the employer can assert 
reasonable business justifications for utilizing it.50  In the strictest approach to the EPA defense, 
                                                 
45 Id. at 712. 
46 Id. at 716. n.30.  
47 Id. at 712-15.  
48 417 U.S. at 208.  
49 See Taylor, 321 F.3d at 710; Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 466.   
50 See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 873.  
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the Eleventh, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits have recognized that multiple factors including prior pay 
may be relied on together, but prior pay alone cannot be used as a justification.51 The three 
different approaches taken by the circuit courts reflect the tension between deferring to an 
employer’s need to control hiring practices and safeguarding women’s wages from the 
problematic influence of prior pay.52  
 
A. The Broad Acceptance Standard – The Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
In Dey v. Colt Const. & Development Co, the Seventh Circuit encapsulated its enduring 
view of prior pay by interpreting the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense as a “broad catch-all 
exception that embraces an almost limitless number of factors, as long as they don’t involve 
sex.”53  This reasoning was later referenced in Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, where 
the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that  “prior wages are a ‘factor other than sex.’”54  
The plaintiff in Wernsing alleged that her male co-worker received a disparate starting 
monthly salary for substantially similar work and claimed that the defendant’s policy was 
discriminatory against women.55 The defendant’s company policy was to "give lateral entrants a 
salary at least equal to what they had been earning previously.”56  Granting summary judgment 
to the employer, who argued that prior salary was a defense under the “any other factor” prong, 
the court reasoned that a plaintiff must “establis[h] by evidence rather that assum[e]” that prior 
                                                 
51 See Irby, 44 F.3d at 949; Angove, 70 F. App’x. at 500;  Balmer, 423 F.3d at 606.  
52 Id. 
53 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994).  
54 47 F.3d at 468; see Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1019 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (finding 
prior pay a sufficient affirmative defense when it is bona fide and not discriminatorily applied, regardless of whether 
business-related). 
55 Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 467.  
56 Id. 
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wages were discriminatory.57 Here, plaintiff did not offer evidence.58 While the court 
acknowledged that “wage patterns in some lines of work can be discriminatory,”  the court 
suggested that such claims require support, such as expert evidence or references to economic 
literature.59  
The Seventh Circuit also voiced criticism of courts, such as those of the Ninth Circuit, 
that impose a business-related requirement for injecting an employer’s own set of acceptable 
business practices, which the Court interpreted as not authorized by the text of the Equal Pay 
Act.60  The Court explained, “[t]he statute asks whether the employer has a reason other than sex 
– not whether it has a ‘good’ reason.”61 A direct target for the Seventh Circuit’s criticism is the 
Ninth Circuit’s Kouba decision, a case that was the origin for the “acceptable business reason” 
requirement.62 The Seventh Circuit claimed that the business justification approach was flawed 
because it treated an EPA claim like a disparate impact theory under Title VII.63 In its reasoning, 
the court noted that a disparate-impact theory under Title VII requires an employer to provide a 
strong reason, such as a business necessity, to defend an allegedly adverse, employment 
practice.64 The court found that the Ninth Circuit’s requirement of a business justification under 
the EPA was inconsistent because the EPA does not have a disparate-impact component and, 
                                                 
57 Id. at 470-71.  
58 Id.   
59 Id. at 470. 
60 See id. at 468-70.  
61 Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 468; accord Taylor, 321 F.3d at 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding the wisdom or reasonableness 
of the defense to be irrelevant).  
62 See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
63 Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 469. (“The Ninth Circuit proceeded as if the Equal Pay Act worked like the disparate-impact 
theory under Title VII: if the plaintiff shows that an employment practice adversely affects protected workers as a 
group, then the employer must provide a strong reason (“business necessity”) for the practice.”) 
64 Id.  
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thus, does not require the employer to provide such a defense for an exclusively disparate-
treatment clam.”65 
The Eighth Circuit similarly emphasized that prior pay can be sufficient by itself as a sex-
neutral factor in an employer’s EPA defense, which the circuit justified in terms of the 
employer’s interest in preserving business autonomy.66 In Taylor v. White, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld a subjective salary retention policy that allowed some higher-paid employees to retain 
their pay when assigned lower pay-grade jobs.67 The court refused to conduct a reasonableness 
inquiry or require the employers to provide a business-related justification for using prior pay, 
while stating that the court is not part of a “super personnel department” and “do[es] not review 
the wisdom of an employer’s chosen means to accomplish its goals.”68   
Although the court noted the importance of a careful review of the record for intentional 
discrimination, the court limited review of prior pay to only evidence that would contradict the 
employer’s assertions of gender-neutrality.69  Moreover, the Eighth Circuit highlighted its 
deference to employer practices by noting that refraining from further evaluation of an 
employer’s salary policy “preserves the business freedoms Congress intended to protect when it 
adopted the catch-all ‘factor other than sex’ affirmative defense.”70  
 
B. A Tougher Scrutiny Standard – The Eleventh, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits  
In contrast, the Eleventh, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits have shared the view of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in finding unequivocally that prior salary 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 See Taylor, 321 F.3d at 723.  
67  Id.   
68 Id. at 719.   
69 See id.; see also Price v. N. States Power Co., 664 F.3d 1186, 1193 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the affirmative 
defense of a “factor other than sex” is facially broad and may include red circling policies).  
70 Taylor, 321 F.3d at 720.  
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alone cannot constitute a “factor other than sex” due to the pervasive risk of prior salaries 
reflecting sex-based compensation discrimination.71  
 In Irby v. Bittick, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer cannot use “prior salary 
alone to justify pay disparity,” but it acknowledged that prior pay when coupled with other 
legitimate factors, such as experience, can form a valid EPA defense.72 The Eleventh Circuit has 
recognized an individual’s experience, training, and ability to constitute adequate justifications 
for pay disparity that can be considered together with prior pay.73 Applying this principle, Irby 
affirmed summary judgement in favor of the defendant because the employer showed that prior 
pay was considered in conjunction with the unique, longer experience of the male employees 
hired as investigators.74  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this limitation on use of prior pay 
was necessary to prevent the central purpose of the EPA from being “swallowed up.” 75  In an 
earlier case, Price v. Lockheed, the Eleventh Circuit’s exacting view was made explicit from the 
beginning: to accept that “prior salary alone is a per se factor other than sex would require this 
court to contravene Congress’ intent and perpetuate the traditionally unequal salaries paid to 
women for equal work.”76  
 The Tenth Circuit joined the Eleventh in taking a firm position that restricts the use of 
prior salary as a justification for pay disparity, while similarly qualifying the limitation to be only 
                                                 
71 See Ida Castro, EEOC New Compliance Manual § 10-Iv.E.1, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html.  
72 44 F.3d at 955-56. See Glenn v. Gen Motors Corp. 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a facially gender-
neutral standard and finding a retention policy alone to be an insufficient defense); see also Lima v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Children & Families, 627 Fed. Appx 782 (11th Cir. 2015). 
73 See Irby, 44 F.3d. at 955; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.   
74 Irby, 44 F.3d at 957. 
75 Id. (citing Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D.Ga. 1993)) (stating that “[i]f prior salary alone were a 
justification, the exception would swallow up the rule and inequality in pay among genders would be perpetuated”).  
76 Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).  
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that of sole use of prior pay.77 In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., the court allowed a defendant 
to successfully raise an affirmative defense under the EPA where the justification asserted for 
pay disparity was that one employee had significantly more retail experience than the other.78 
The Eleventh Circuit explained that it would accept an EPA defense “where an employer sets a 
new employee’s salary based upon that employee’s previous salary and qualifications and 
experience the employee brings.”79 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit allows 
prior pay to be used only along with other factors that are grounded in the employee’s actual 
experience and skills in order to prevent reliance on a distorted and possibly biased number.80   
In accord with the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit also allows 
consideration of an employee’s prior salary as long as the employer is not depending only on this 
number as a justification for pay disparity.81 The Sixth Circuit has further expounded on what it  
will accept as legitimate factors allowed under the “factor other than sex” defense.82  In Balmer 
v. HCA, Inc., the court held that a pay disparity between a woman and her male colleague was 
justified because the higher-paid male had negotiated a higher salary and, “most importantly, the 
ultimate decision maker [used by the employer] determined that [the male employee] had greater 
relevant industry experience than [the] Plaintiff.”83  The Sixth Circuit has also accepted union 
membership as a legitimate “factor other than sex.”84 In Perkins v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., the 
court accepted a justification for a pay differential that was based on a combination of the male 
                                                 
77 Angove, 70 Fed. Appx. at 500; see Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that a 
31% disparity between a male and female employees’ salaries could not be justified simply by prior salary).  
78 70 Fed. Appx. at 508.  
79 Id. at 612.  
80 See id.  
81 Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2005).  
82 Id. at 612-13.  
83 Id. at 613.  
84 See Perkins v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., No. 6-1798, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1172 at *11-12 (6th Cir. June 30, 
2017). 
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employee’s prior salary, length of experience, and union membership, which helped facilitate 
negotiations for a higher salary than the plaintiff-colleague.85  
 While the employees tended to lose even under this test, the Eleventh, Tenth, and Sixth 
Circuits at least represent a more critical evaluation of what an employer may assert as a 
justification for pay disparity.86 In doing so, these circuits highlight the underlying risk of 
discrimination behind a seemingly neutral factor like prior pay, which may go overlooked by 
courts enacting broader, more lenient standards on the “factor other than sex” defense.  
 
C. The Business Justification Standard – The Ninth Circuit  
As a middle ground approach, the business justification approach permits reliance on 
prior salary alone as a “factor other than sex,” but only if the employer can assert reasonable 
business justifications for utilizing it.87 In Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Company, the Ninth 
Circuit originated the “acceptable business reason” requirement. 88  The court held that reliance 
on prior salary should not be rejected as a “factor other than sex” per se; rather, the employer is 
required to demonstrate that the reliance on past salary is used to “effectuate some business 
policy” and the “employer must use the factor reasonably in light of the employer’s stated 
purpose as well as its other practices.”89 Applying its new standard, the court reversed and 
remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgement against the defendant, Allstate, in 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 See Brake, Deborah L., Reviving Paycheck Fairness: Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense Matters, 
52 IDAHO L. REV. 889, 898 (2016).  
87 See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 873. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 876-77. (“R]elevant considerations in evaluating reasonableness [of considering prior salary in setting 
wages] include (1) whether employer also uses other available predictors of the new employee's performance, (2) 
whether the employer attributes less significance to prior salary once the employee has proven himself or herself on 
the job, and (3) whether the employer relies more heavily on salary when the prior job resembles [the new job].”).  
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order to determine if it could provide a reasonable business justification for its reliance on prior 
pay for a female sales agent’s salary.90  
In sharp contrast with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ approach, the Ninth Circuit has 
asserted that applying only a facially neutral test to a “factor other than sex” would be 
“manifestly incompatible with the [Equal Pay] Act’s purpose” because “an employer could 
easily manipulate factors having a close correlation to gender as a guise to pay female employees 
discriminatorily low salaries.”91 However, in Kouba, the Ninth Circuit admitted the limits of its 
own approach by recognizing that even with a business-related requirement, an employer might 
easily assert a business justification as a pretext for a discriminatory purpose.92 Furthermore, the 
court recognized that the likelihood of a business justification being used for discriminatory 
objectives is especially significant with “a factor like prior salary which can easily be used to 
capitalize on the unfairly low salaries historically paid to women.”93 To rationalize the use of the 
business justification approach, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the ability of courts to protect 
against such abuse is somewhat limited,” and, therefore, the court deemed this to be the best, 
most “pragmatic” approach to protect against abuse yet accommodate employer discretion.94  
After the business justification standard in Kouba was established in 1982, the approach 
has been integrated into a number of other courts in decades since.95 While the Sixth Circuit 
rejects the notion that prior pay can be relied on alone,96 it takes a similar view to the Ninth 
                                                 
90 Id. at 878.   
91 Id. at 876. See also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
congressional intent supports the approach that a “factor other than sex” must be business-related and not solely 
based on gender-neutrality). 
92 Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 See Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2017); Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 524.  
96 See Balmer, 423 F.3d at 612. 
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Circuit on the concept that the fourth affirmative defense does “not include literally any other 
factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.”97   
Within the Ninth Circuit, the Rizo v. Yovino decision has reignited the debate as to the 
appropriate rule.98 A panel of the court originally reaffirmed the Kouba precedent, but the en 
banc court vacated that decision and is posed to address the question afresh. 99 Therefore, the 
Circuit’s business-related standard appears to be in doubt. 
 In Rizo, the plaintiff was a math teacher who found out after being hired that she was 
making a lower salary than men who were in comparable positions with similar experience at her 
school.100 The defendant, the County School District, gave business justifications for its defense 
of a prior pay policy that created the wage differential: the policy (1) is objective, (2) encourages 
candidates to leave other jobs because candidates will always receive a five percent pay increase 
over their prior salary, (3) prevents favoritism, and (4) is a judicious use of taxpayer dollars.101  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel viewed itself as bound by its long-standing 
Kouba precedent in holding that the County’s justifications effectuated a business policy that 
was reasonable.102 In response to the approach that prior pay cannot be a sole factor, the court 
reasoned that it “could not understand how the employer’s consideration of other factors would 
prevent the perpetuation of existing pay disparities if…prior salary is the only factor that causes 
                                                 
97 EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); see Balmer, 423 F.3 at 612.  
98 See Terry Carter, Employers Can Pay Women Less Than Men Based on Salary Histories, 9th Circuit Rules, ABA 
JOURNAL (April 27. 2017, 2:15PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/woman_employee_pay_past_salary_9th_circuiit.  
99 See Rizo, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (order vacating judgment and granting en banc review). 
100 Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1163-64.  
101 Id. at 1165.  
102 Id. at 1167.  
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the current disparity.”103 En banc review,104  however, signals a possible shift against precedent 
and toward a potentially stricter standard.  
 
Part IV.  The Supreme Court Should Ban Employers from Relying on Prior Pay Alone 
Under the EPA’s “Factor Other Than Sex” Defense  
 
As signified by the Ninth Circuit’s reconsideration of its long-standing precedent, the 
time has come to recognize how the acceptance of an employer’s sole reliance on prior pay as an 
EPA defense helps to sustain a cap on women’s salaries which must be shattered to achieve 
equal pay for the two sexes. Considering how a single prior salary number can perpetuate 
discriminatory pay for a lifetime, the division among the circuits is best solved by restricting 
reliance on prior pay as much as possible. The Ninth’s Circuit’s business justification approach, 
which allows sole reliance on prior pay as long as there are legitimate business reasons to 
support it,105 is nearly as problematic and deferential as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, which 
freely accept business practices relying only on prior salary.106  
The Supreme Court should weigh in on what constitutes “factors other than sex” and, in 
accordance with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, allow prior pay only to be used with other 
legitimate factors, but never alone.107 While businesses have a legitimate interest in using prior 
pay to determine salaries and compete for ideal candidates, employers are not without alternative 
means to satisfy these needs through methods, such as pay targets, which do not sanction 
unequal pay for equal work. If it is still important to the courts to help close the gender gap as it 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1166.  
104 Rizo, 869 F.3d at 1004.  
105 See Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1161; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.  
106 See Taylor, 321 F.3d at 710; Wernsing., 47 F.3d at 466.  
107 See Irby, 44 F.3d at 949; Angove, 70 Fed. Appx. at 500.  
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once was to Congress in 1963 when the EPA was enacted,108 then the Supreme Court should 
provide a firm restriction against sole reliance on this factor.  
 
A. Sole Reliance on a Woman’s Prior Pay History Perpetuates the Cycle of Discriminatory 
Wages  
 
In Irby v. Bittick, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “if prior salary alone were a 
justification, the exception would swallow up the rule and inequality in pay among genders 
would be perpetuated.”109 As this statement suggests, the circuit courts rejecting reliance solely 
on prior pay recognize the adverse effect that this factor inflicts on pay equality.110 The effect of 
perpetuating an engrained wage disparity between genders directly conflicts with the broadly 
remedial purpose of the EPA to ensure women are paid equal to men for similar work.111  
1. Statistics on the Adverse Effect of Prior Pay Reliance  
Although there may be various reasons why pay inequality still exists between men and 
women, there is significant weight to the Eleventh Circuit’s notion that reliance on a female 
employee’s prior salary can play a crucial role in prolonging the pay gap among similarly-
situated men and women.112  Recent statistics suggest that if employers base starting pay on the 
wages of employees’ past jobs, women on average will continue to receive lower salaries than 
men for substantially equal work.113 In a Glassdoor study reported in 2016, researchers found 
that men earn 5.4 percent more in base pay and 7.4 percent in overall compensation than their 
                                                 
108 See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195. 
109 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D.Ga. 1993). 
110 See Irby, 44 F.3d at 949; Angove, 70 Fed. Appx. at 500; Price, 856 F.2d at 1506.  
111 See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195; 109 CONG. REC. 9193 (1963) (statement of Rep. Bolton).  
112 See Irby, 44 F.3d at 946.  
113 See Dr. Andrew Chamberlain, Demystifying the Gender Pay Gap: Evidence from Glassdoor Salary Data, 
GLASSDOOR (2016), https://www.glassdoor.com/research/app/uploads/sites/2/2016/03/Glassdoor-Gender-Pay-Gap-
Study.pdf.  
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female colleagues with the same titles at the same companies.114 The study noted that while some 
of that gap was attributed to variables such as experience and education, a third of the gap 
remained unexplained, but was likely the result of an undervaluation of women’s work and 
institutionalized bias on how they should be rewarded.115  
In another study regarding teachers similar to the plaintiff in Rizo, the Department for 
Professional Employees demonstrated that “[f]emale elementary and middle school teachers 
earned over 14% less than similarly situated men, despite compromising almost 82% of the 
field.”116 Therefore, statistics suggest that employers that rely solely on a woman’s prior salary 
are most likely in effect facilitating the average lower salary rates that persist for women.   
While studies show that the pay disparity between similarly-situated men and women is a 
continuing problem, employers often rely on an employee’s past salary without evaluating 
whether the figure itself is the product of previous gender discrimination and, therefore, may 
unknowingly perpetuate a history of discriminatory pay rates.117 Courts have also recognized the 
critical difficulty in determining whether an employee’s previous salary violated the EPA.118  A 
court deciding an EPA claim or an employer looking into an employee’s prior pay may find that 
previous employers are not easily accessible and disaggregating the components that form a prior 
pay disparity can be impossible to determine.119  In Wersing, the Seventh Circuit held that an 
employer could rely on prior salary as long as there was no evidence of discrimination.120 If  a 
                                                 
114 Id. at 2, 19.  
115 Id. at 3.  
116 AFL-CIO, Dep’t for Professional Employees, Fact Sheet 2010, Professional Women: Vital Statistics, at 3 (2010), 
https://www.payequity.org/PDFs/ProfWomen.pdf.   
117 See Robert Brody & Lindsay Rinehart, The Equal Pay Act, 22 L.J. NEWSLETTERS 3 (2017).  
118 See Covington v. Southern Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317,322-23 (7th Cir. 1987).  
119 See Jeanne M. Hamburg, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard for the Identification of 
“Factors Other Than Sex Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1103-04 n.117 (1989). 
120 Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 471.  
 20 
court has adopted this rule, a finding of nondiscrimination will hold little weight due to the 
difficulties that hinder the proper discovery of such information.   
2. Problematic Market Forces  
Another problematic element of prior salary that perpetuates wage disparity is its 
foundation in the widely discredited market forces theory. A market force involves the value 
assigned by the market to men’s and women’s work or the greater bargaining power that men 
have historically commanded.121 Under this theory, an employer may use a practice of paying 
male employees more than their female counterparts in the same position simply because of the 
male employee’s higher market value.122  While the Supreme Court ruled that market forces do 
not constitute “factors other than sex,”123 the Seventh Circuit has suggested that market wage 
patterns could be relied on despite the implications of unequal pay.124 In Wernsing, the court 
noted that “markets are impersonal and have no intent,” while arguing that discrimination cannot 
necessarily be assumed from women’s lower market wages.125 
The same implicit acceptance of market forces as a “factor other than sex” appears to be 
supported by the Ninth Circuit panel. In Rizo, the County’s business justifications for relying on 
prior salary to determine the plaintiff’s earnings involved factors which had little to do with the 
employee’s qualifications for a math teacher position.126 By asserting conservation of taxpayer 
money as one of the rationales for the prior pay policy, the County assumed it could cut costs by 
paying employees less based on candidates’ lower prior salary rates.127 As stated in their petition 
                                                 
121 National Women’s Law Center, Paycheck Fairness: Closing the “Factor other than Sex” Gap in the Equal Pay 
Act, (2009), https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/FactorOtherThanSex.pdf. 
122 See Castro, supra note 71.   
123 See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 205.  
124 See Wernsing, 47 F.3d at 469-70.  
125 Id.   
126 Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1165.  
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for a rehearing of the Court of Appeals decision,  the plaintiff’s attorneys contended that this 
justification is an “overt statement of the ‘market forces theory’’ and  “is inconsistent with the 
EPA.”128  While this justification may be economically advantageous, the County essentially 
accepted as a legitimate factor that women may on average be paid less than men, which is 
contrary to the gender-neutral purpose of the “factor other than sex” defense.  
Employers using a market defense may also rely on a salary negotiation involving prior 
pay to justify paying a male employer more than a woman performing equal work.129 In Horner 
v. Mary Institute, the Eighth Circuit held that a salary negotiation could constitute a “factor other 
than sex,” where a school established a valid pay disparity primarily due to the fact that the male 
employee asked for more money than his female counterpart.130 However, research has shown 
that women on average negotiate less than men,131 and scholars have asserted that this 
differential may be grounded in a woman’s fear of repercussions by her employer for violating 
social norms.132 One scholar, who conducted an experiment on why women negotiate less, found 
that “male evaluators penalized women more than men for attempting to negotiate for higher 
compensation,” while many female candidates who initiated negotiation were generally deemed 
“not nice and overly demanding.”133 Although negotiation based on prior salary might be 
                                                 
128 Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 10, Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 
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essential for business reasons, the employer is accepting a risk that gender-based inequality 
underlies such a market defense.134 
Comparatively, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected reliance on market forces and explained 
that “the argument that supply and demand dictates that women qua women may be paid less is 
exactly the kind of evil that the [EPA] was designed to eliminate, and has been rejected.”135 In 
Glenn, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized how the legislative history of the EPA indicates that the 
“factor other than sex exception applies when the disparity results from unique characteristics of 
the same job,”  such as experience, skills, or training.136 Therefore, when a court accepts prior 
pay as a sole basis for salary determination, it places more value on market forces than on the 
“unique characteristics” of employees  and, in effect, undermines the purpose of the “factor other 
than sex” defense.137  
 
B. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits Emphasize a Valid Employer Interest  
 
The circuits that allow sole reliance on prior pay emphasize a need to accommodate  
business interests as a reason for maintaining their broader view of the “factor other than sex” 
defense.138 While the Eighth and Seventh Circuits do not agree with the business justification 
approach, all three circuits underscore an acceptance of employer discretion in hiring 
practices.139 Though deferring to employers’ interests does not excuse the pervasive issue of 
                                                 
134 See Deborah Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. 
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gender pay inequality, these circuits suggest that there is a legitimate countervailing need for 
employers to use prior salary in order to satisfy necessary business objectives and minimize 
costs.  
Scholars on the prior pay issue have noted that employers prevented from relying on prior 
pay may experience more difficulty in attracting talented applicants and determining competitive 
salaries.140 Employers commonly depend on a prior salary number to determine what 
competitors are paying in order to establish the salary necessary to incentivize a desirable 
candidate to take an offered position.141 Furthermore, employers may require prior salary as an 
initial means to assess the value of a job candidate’s skills.142  
State jurisdictions further demonstrate the tension between legitimate business interests 
that depend on prior salary and the need to eradicate gender-based pay differentials. While many 
states have enacted bans on prior salary inquiry, the Chamber of Commerce for Greater 
Philadelphia has challenged the city’s pay ordinance against consideration of prior salary by 
highlighting its unintended adverse consequences on businesses.143  To support an argument 
against laws banning prior salary inquiry, the Chamber cited business burdens that would likely 
reduce an employer’s ability to hire.144 Thus, the Chamber’s argument suggests that without an 
ability to rely on prior pay, employers may be hindered by a diminished capacity to fill necessary 
positions attached to salaries that are both within budget and attractive to the right candidates.145 
                                                 
140 See Micala Robinson, A Woman’s Worth: Closing the Gender Pay Gap, 223 NEW JERSEY L.J. 47 (2017); 
Hamburg, supra note 119, at 1102.  
141  Hamburg, supra note 119, at 1102; see Sparrock v. NYP Holdings, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125889, at *40 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008) (holding that matching a prior salary is permitted under the EPA because it allows an 
employer to award for experience and to attract talented people from other backgrounds); see also Osborn v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 377, 385 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding that “market forces… and inducement to hire 
the best person for the job have been held to be legitimate factors justifying pay differentials” under the Act). 
142 Hamburg, supra note 119, at 1102.  
143 Robinson, supra note 140.  
144 Id.  
145 See id.  
 24 
C. Consideration of Prior Pay Along with Other Factors Demonstrating Experience and 
Skill Is an Effective Bar to Discriminatory Pay and Accommodates Business Interests 
 
The rigorous approach of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits is superior to that of the 
approach followed by the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits because the courts not only 
recognize prior pay’s effect on perpetuating pay inequality, but also promote a way to properly 
regulate its use without banning it completely. These circuits allow the employer to prove that 
sex was not a factor in salary determination by accepting evaluation of prior pay as long as it is 
considered among other legitimate factors.146 By considering prior pay in conjunction with other 
factors such as experience, the employer can more effectively determine that prior salary 
accurately reflects the employee’s abilities or qualifications related to the job or it can show 
simply that that there are other adequate justifications for setting the employee’s salary.147  
Factors such as relevant, experience, education, skills, and training are not based on 
gender and are crucial for an employer’s evaluation of which candidates have suitable 
qualifications.148 In contrast, the Office of Personnel Management has noted that an employee’s 
“existing rate of pay is not reflective of the candidate’s current qualifications or existing labor 
market conditions.”149 For example, a woman who is returning to the workplace after taking time 
off to raise her child will have a prior salary rate that may not properly indicate what her skills 
and experience would be worth in the present market, which may limit her earnings at a 
company that allows pay differentials based on prior pay alone.150 Therefore, if an employer 
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must rely on factors in relation to an employee’s actual qualifications along with the prior salary 
figure, then the likelihood of perpetuating pay inequality for women is diminished.  
 
D. The Business Justification Approach is Flawed Because There Are More Effective 
Alternative Means to Accommodate Employer Interests  
 
While the Kouba court may have intended to accommodate both employers and  
employees’ interests by imposing a business justification requirement,151 the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately perpetuates gender-based pay inequality by refusing to implement the necessary 
restrictions needed to limit employer reliance on prior pay. The Ninth Circuit has admitted the 
risks involved with relying on prior salary, yet reasoned that the court was limited in its 
protection against misuse of prior salary and was compelled to accommodate employer 
discretion.152  However, the Ninth Circuit’s business justification test undermines the broad, anti-
discriminatory purpose of the EPA, and the Circuit mistakenly views the business justification 
test as the only practical way to accommodate business interests. 
The District Court in Rizo, highlights the essential problem of the business justification 
approach: “[A] pay structure based exclusively on prior wages is so inherently fraught with the 
risk - indeed, here, the virtual certainty - that it will perpetuate a discriminatory wage disparity 
between men and women that it cannot stand, even if motivated by a legitimate non-
discriminatory business purpose.”153 Therefore, the court suggests that business justifications for 
relying on prior salary, while reasonable ways of effectuating business policies, can extend 
discriminatory, gender-based pay whether intentional or not.154 A scholar also asserts that by 
failing to consider qualifications, skills, or experience necessary for the position, the Ninth 
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Circuit’s approach does nothing to weed out gender-based pay as courts are likely to accept any 
rationale from employers.155  
 While the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits offer the better method of accommodating both 
employer and employee interests through a consideration of prior pay among other legitimate 
factors involving job qualifications, businesses are able to utilize an alternative to prior pay that 
would effectuate similar hiring purposes without undermining the EPA.156 Employers have 
successfully used pay targets as a means of setting salaries within the range of what a job is 
actually worth and what the employer is able to afford, while leaving some room for 
negotiation.157 To calculate pay targets, a company may take into account the average of what its 
current employees in the position make or other general estimates, which in effect allows 
employees to “start with a clean slate and mitigate any bias embedded within [the employee’s] 
prior compensation.”158 Furthermore, employers may also use pay rates to determine the wage 
practices of competition, which employers have similarly used prior pay for determining.159  
 
Part V. Conclusion  
When Congress enacted the EPA in 1963, it engrained in the law the simple principle that 
“equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.”160 In order to effect wage equality, the act was 
intended as a broad, remedial solution for women to be paid the same as their male colleagues in 
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substantially similar positions.161 Under the EPA, an employer may assert one of four affirmative 
defenses, including a “factor other than sex,” although the Supreme Court has yet to fully 
address the scope of what factors exactly qualify under this defense.162 
The circuit courts remain divided on whether prior salary may alone qualify as a “factor 
other than sex.” Some circuits have limited acceptance of prior pay as a defense to protect 
against possible past discrimination, while others defer more to the needs and freedoms of 
business hiring practices. Due to the pervading wage gap between genders, it is evident that 
women on average have been and continue to be paid less than men for equal work despite the 
remedial nature of the EPA. Therefore, when an employer relies on prior pay itself to determine 
a woman’s salary, the risk is great that this practice is perpetuating pay inequality. In order to 
mitigate this pernicious cycle of wage inequality that continues to affect women, the Supreme 
Court should solve the circuit split by holding that an employer’s reliance on prior salary alone 
cannot constitute a “factor other than sex.”  
While courts cannot ignore that employers have a valid interest in relying on prior pay to 
further necessary business policies and attract candidates, the circuit courts can better integrate 
those concerns with that of wage equality by allowing prior salary to be considered within a mix 
of other legitimate factors implicating the employee’s actual qualifications and skills. In order to 
affect change and fulfill the goal of the EPA, the court system should be willing to place stricter 
barriers on employer practices, such as prior pay, which are impeding the long overdue closing 
of the wage gap.   
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